The aim of this article is to trace the evolution in the meaning of the concept of Sunnah prior to its classical definition, which largely confluences it with the concept of an authentic ( ṣ aḥ īḥ ) Ḥ adīth as defined by the classical Ḥ adīth sciences. This article will first describe the semanico-contextual changes in the meaning of the term Sunnah during the period under examination and then present a chronological analysis of the development of the concept 'Sunnah' in relation to the development of the concept 'authentic Ḥ adīth'. This article argues that during the first four generations of Muslims, the concept 'Sunnah' remained epistemologically independent of the concept 'authentic Ḥ adīth' and that evaluation of Sunnah compliance with a certain practice or belief remained methodologically independent to that of the concept of an authentic Ḥ adīth, as defined by classical ʿulūm al-ḥ adīth sciences.
Introduction
Throughout Islamic historical experience, the Sunnah, alongside the Qurʾān, has been considered to be one of the primary sources of Islamic Law. 2 The need for Sunnah as a source of Islamic Law stems from the actual nature of the Qurʾānic Revelation itself and the role played by the Prophet Muhammad in the "Prophetic-Revelatory event" to borrow Graham's phrase. 3 By the term 'nature of the Qurʾānic revelation' one means its Deutungsbeduerftigkeit, i.e., its need for interpretation and, more specifically in the context of Islamic Law, its limited usefulness for the purposes of establishing a comprehensive and systematic socio-political and legal system. 4 Traditionally it found its expression in the maxim: al-qurʾān ahwaj ilā s-sunnah min al-sunnah ilā l-qurʾān (i.e. the Qurʾān is in need of Sunnah more than Sunnah is in need of the Qurʾān). 5 In order to fill the Qurʾānic gap, the early Muslim community took recourse to the concept Sunnah, a pre-Qurʾānic tribal custom signifying emulation-worthiness of a certain individual whose conduct becomes a norm for others to follow. This was based on the premise that Prophet Muhammad's embodiment of the Qurʾānic Message, that took place in a variety of contexts over a period of more than 20 years during his Prophethood, is to be considered the most authoritative model for subsequent generations of Muslim to follow as well as its having normative value for the setting of legal antecedents and law explication purposes. Therefore, the concept Sunnah is overall very significant in Islamic thought and forms a basis for a large segment of Islamic law and theology. Moreover, as the author has argued elsewhere, 7 differences in the evaluation of Sunnah compliance with certain practices and beliefs has been responsible for the emergence of conflicting views on a variety of issues pertaining to both the realms of Islamic jurisprudence and belief, while all claiming to be firmly rooted in the Qurʾān and Sunnah/Ḥ adīth.
As described below, the classical concept of Sunnah has been defined in a way that renders it hermeneutically completely dependent upon the body of Ḥ adīth literature. In this article, we refer to this definition of Sunnah as Ḥ adīth-dependent Sunnah.
This article attempts to answer the following questions.
• Does the traditional definition of Sunnah that took root and established itself during the post-formative or classical period 8 of Islamic thought 9 reflect the way this term was understood during the preclassical period?
• If not, as this article argues, how did this classical definition of Sunnah emerge and which mechanisms were responsible for its conflation with an authentic Ḥ adīth as defined by the classical ʿulūm al-ḥ adīth sciences and when did they become apparent?
As such the aim of this article is to outline a chronological analysis of the development of the Sunnah concept and, in particular, how long it remained distinct from its classical definition. In order to do this, we trace how the meaning and definition of the Sunnah concept has evolved during the first four generations of Muslims and prior to its classical definition which confluences it with the concept of an authentic ( ṣ aḥ īḥ ) Ḥ adīth as defined by the classical Ḥ adīth sciences (ʿulūm al-ḥ adīth). This article will first describe semanico-contextual changes in the meaning of the term Sunnah during the period under examination and then present a chronological analysis of how the concept has evolved in relation to the development of an authentic Ḥ adīth defined by the classical Ḥ adīth sciences. This article argues that, during the first four generations of Muslims, the Sunnah concept remained epistemologically independent of that for an authentic Ḥ adīth and that evaluation of the Sunnah's compliance with a certain practice or belief remained methodologically independent to that of an authentic Ḥ adīth.
The Classical Concept of the Definition of the Sunnah Concept
According to classical Islamic scholarship, as defined by the muḥ adīthūn, 10 the concept Sunnah in terms of its authenticity 11 is defined as comprising 10 Experts on the transmission of Ḥ adīth, their compiling, classification and authenticity. 11 A sound Ḥ adīth and therefore Sunnah, in its 'post-Shāfiʿī form (see our discussion in the main text below) consisted of a matn (text) and isnād (chain of transmitters), usually but not always going back to the Prophet. Muḥ adīthūn have formulated an impressively elaborate and complex hierarchy of Ḥ adīth authenticity but not of their epistemological worth which was the task of the fuqahāʾ (uṣ ūliyyūn). The evaluation of the soundness of the Ḥ adīth, a task of the muḥ adīthūn, is based upon the ʿadalah/uprightness of the narrators founded on certain criteria such as his/her memory and character regardless of their epistemological value. The epistemological study of Ḥ adīth and Sunnah is primarily studied by the fuqahāʾ and the uṣ ūliyyūn or the Islamic jurists and legal theorists. This study of Ḥ adīth/Sunnah is concerned with the number of individual chains of narrations (isnād ) ranging from ahad to mutawātir Ḥ adīth were a part of the larger concern of fuqahāʾ relating to legal methodology (uṣ ūl al-fiqh). The mutawātir Ḥ adīth are those narrations, which have been transmitted by such a large number of people that, according to great majority of fuqahāʾ (they yield certain or immediate (darurī) knowledge. It must be noted, however, that there is no consensus on either the criteria pertaining to assessment of uprightness of narrators ('ilm al-rijal ), or on how many isnāds constitute and render a narration mutawātir. There are indeed very few mutawātir Ḥ adīth, including those which (could) relate to law. Ahad Ḥ adīth, on the other hand, are those narrations, which do not fulfill the mutawātir criteria and by default do not yield certain knowledge ( yaqin) as stipulated by the majority of Muslim jurists, but only zann or uncertainty and are thus legally not binding and cannot be considered as part of ʿaqidah or Islamic creed. Therefore, the fuqahāʾ and uṣ ūliyyūn numerous narratives documenting Prophet Muhammad's deeds ( fiʿl ), utterances (qawl ) and spoken approval 12 (taqrīr) as embodied in various Ḥ adīth compendia considered 'authentic' according to the standards and criteria applied by classical Ḥ adīth science criticism (ʿulūm al-ḥ adīth). 13 The definition of the concept Sunnah has several implications, which here we will call Ḥ adīth-dependent Sunnah. First, it assumes that the scope of Sunnah is epistemologically dependent upon and constrained by Ḥ adīth, i.e. that it has the same epistemological value as that of each 'authentic' Ḥ adīth and that the Ḥ adīth is the sole depository and vehicle for Sunnahic perpetuation. Secondly, it assumes that Sunnah is methodologically dependent upon the Ḥ adīth. Being methodologically dependent on the Ḥ adīth implies that Sunnah compliance (or otherwise) with certain (legal or theological) practices or principles is and can only be determined by sifting through numerous narratives reportedly going back to the time of the Prophet Muhammad via an authentic chain of narrators (isnād ). Thirdly, as a corollary to the second premise, coalescing and substituting the nature and scope of the concept Sunnah with that of Ḥ adīth breaks the symbiotic and organic relationship between the concept of the Qurʾān and Sunnah as it existed during the first four Islamic generations, 14 thus making the Qurʾān increasingly more hermeneutically dependent upon the Ḥ adīth compendia. Fourthly, as a result of the above, the Sunnah's organic and symbiotic relationship with the Qurʾān, termed by Graham as the "Prophetic-Revelatory event", was severed and the Qurʾān's hermeneutical dependence upon Ḥ adīth body of knowledge entrenched. Fifthly, the Sunnah's function and purpose, as will be demonstrated below, became increasingly positively legalistic. 15 methodology of deriving Sunnah is different to that of the muḥ adīthūn, and will become apparent in the main text below, closer to the way the concept of Sunnah was understood during the pre-classical period as they only accept the mutawātir Ḥ adīth to constitute Sunnah. However the definitions of Sunnah are both the same.
12 Some definitions also 14 As shall be demonstrated below. 15 Rather than being conceptualised primarily as ethico-religious or values-based.
Prior to addressing the questions raised above, a brief remark about the nature and scope of the concept Sunnah is in order. As we argued elsewhere, the pre-classical concept of Sunnah 16 was based upon a hermeneutically symbiotic relationship with the Qurʾānic discourse as premised upon the principle of the Qurʾān's deutungsbedeurftigkeit. The nature and scope of the concept Sunnah, furthermore, constituted four different elements: sunnah akhlaqiyyah (ethico-moral or values-based component also based on the objective nature of ethical values), sunnah ʿaqidiyyah (theological or religious component), sunnah fiqhiyyah (legal component which was a reason inclusive and a values-based component that recognised the objective nature of ethical values) and sunnah ʿamaliyyah/ibadiyyah (practice-based component). 17 For the purposes of this article, it is important to keep in mind that all these components of the Sunnah can be formulated, preserved and transmitted independent of any written documentation. Another important consideration to be kept in mind throughout this discussion is the fact that, during the entire period under investigation, the production, maintenance and perpetuation of knowledge, including nascent sciences such as jurisprudence, theology and Qurʾānic commentary, was oral rather than written. 18 As such the concept Sunnah that was called upon and employed throughout this period, as demonstrated below, could and did exist independent of written Ḥ adīth.
Evolution in the Nature and Scope of the Concepts Sunnah and Ḥ adīth
Section 3 presents how the concept Sunnah has evolved vis-à-vis the development of what constitutes an 'authentic' Ḥ adīth from the time of the Prophet until the middle of the third century Hijrah when the Ḥ adīth-based Sunnah gained wide acceptance among Muslim jurists and 16 Duderija, "Methodology", supra note 7, pp. 269-280. 17 Some evidence which confirms these assertions will be presented on pp. 8-9. For more, see Duderija, "Methodology", supra note 7. The ʿamaliyyah component could also include the administrative and/or political aspects of Sunnah highlighted by Mathnee. theologians. The analysis first investigates semantico-contextual and thereafter epistemologico-methodological changes in the concept Sunnah.
Semantico-contextual Changes in Definition and Scope of the Sunnah
Ansari has pointed out several difficulties one encounters when studying the terminology used during the early period of Islamic thought. One such problem is the "comparative lack of fixity in technical connotations of terms in use"
19 which resulted in a gradual change in connotation over a period of time. An important aspect in these semantical changes in terminology is their increasing 'technical', or what the author would describe as legalistic, 20 connotations. Moreover, and importantly, these terms had a multiplicity of meanings even when employed by the same author in the same work.
21
Another important principle for the purpose of this study that Ansari has identified with reference to the changes in meaning of certain words and concepts is the notion of a significant time gap between the usages of the conceptual and technical/legalistic aspects of terminology. Put differently, words prior to acquiring "standard technical phraseology" had other meanings and were used in other contexts. 22 The above distinctions are of fundamental importance to this study from the point of view of understanding the validity of the classical definition of the concept Sunnah.
We now will examine the semantico-contextual changes of the concept Sunnah. The term will be analysed by examining its etymological (preQurʾānic) meaning(s), Qurʾānic meaning(s) and post-Qurʾānic usage(s).
19 Z.I. Ansari, "Islamic Juristic Terminology before Shāfiʿī: A Semantical Analysis with Special Reference to Kufa", Arabica, xix (1972) 279. 20 In the sense of as they are being used in literature on Islamic jurispurudence ( fiqh) and legal theory (uṣ ūl ul-fiqh). For the difference between fiqh and uṣ ūl ul-fiqh, see, e.g., H. Kamali, "Introduction", in: The Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 21 Ansari, supra note 19, p. 270. 22 This suggests that their definition was imprecise and ambiguous, probably because these terms as concepts were quite broad and abstract in nature and were associated with ethico-moral values rather than specified edified rules/laws or dogma. We shall explore this in subsequent parts of this article.
3.1.1. Etymological, Qurʾānic and post-Qurʾānic meanings of Sunnah Etymologically, the term Sunnah underwent several semantic changes. 23 It originated from the Arabic root S-N-N that probably referred to "flow and continuity of a thing with ease and smoothness". 24 Over time, the term Sunnah was increasingly used in the context of human behaviour, and as "a way, course, rule, mode or manner of acting or conducting life of life", thus becoming equivalent to the word sira. Thereafter it evolved to signify moral appropriateness and normativeness of a human worthy of being followed. 25 Ibn Manzur defines Sunnah as a "commendable straightforward manner of conducting oneself (al-sunnat al-tariqat al-maḥ mudat al-mustaqimah).
26 By its very nature it implies normativeness, i.e. having a normative character.
With respect to the Qurʾān, the Sunnah has been used on numerous occasions with regard to the immutable laws of the retribution of God (sunnahāt allāh) with respect to people who repeatedly transgressed these laws with disdain. 27 The phrase sunnahāt al-awwalīn refers to the ancient people or nations who, having brought upon themselves the wrath of God by rejecting and killing His Messengers, were doomed and turned to dust.
28
Interestingly the term Sunnah of the Messenger of Allāh (sunnahāt un-nabi), a fundamental concept in post-Qurʾānic Islamic thought, does not occur in the Qurʾān. The Prophet is, however, praised in the Qurʾān as "uswah al-ḥ asanah" (a good/beautiful/excellent example) for Muslims. 29 Ansari aptly remarks that this use of the term is consistent with the overall Qurʾānic attitude towards all other Prophets.
Considering the status and authority that the Prophet enjoyed by his followers, especially in the Medinian period, and the etymological background of the word Sunnah as just described, it would be only commonsense to maintain that the expression "Sunnah of the Prophet" would have been used in the early Muslim community in the sense of being Qurʾānically sanctioned model-behaviour of the Prophet. 30 Furthermore, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the Prophet himself, the early caliphs such as ʿUmar (d. 23 AH), Uthman (d. 35 AH) and Ali (d. 40 AH), as well as the people at the time of early Umayyad caliphs (e.g., Abd al-Mālik, 65-86 AH), used this sunnah al-nabi (Prophet's Sunnah) expression on numerous occasions.
31
Apart from its usage in a phrase sunnah al-nabi in the first and especially second half of the first century Hijrah, the word Sunnah has been used in the following ways. Sunnah refers to the "right and just practice" of the Prophet, 32 Sunnah of caliphs preceding Uthman (i.e., Abu Bakr and Umar); 33 Sunnah of believers; 34 Sunnah as a norm to be followed in jurisprudential sense; 35 and Sunnah as distinct from Ḥ adīth.
36
Although still quite general and vague at the beginning of the second century, the term Sunnah, with the rise of sciences of jurisprudence (uṣ ūl al-fiqh), was being increasingly but not exclusively used in a legal sense. 37 Ansari gives us following Sunnah meanings from that period in time: obedience and loyalty of the people to the ruling government in accordance with the book (Qurʾān) and Sunnah; 38 emphasis on the Sunnah as something that can be traced back to the time of the Prophet and/ or early caliphs (in contrast to just any practice adopted by the people); A somewhat different and more nuanced understanding of the concept of Sunnah in Mālik's Muwaṭ ṭ a that is still independent of Ḥ adīth is argued by Guraya who defines it as a concept based on "recognized Islamic religious norms and accepted standards of conduct derived from the religious and ethical principles introduced by the Prophet". 52 Importantly, Guraya also identifies Sunnah' constituents which shall be discussed subsequently.
Another definition of Sunnah that does not depend upon its writtenbased documentation is argued by Pakistani scholars Moiz Amjad and Ghamidi. They define Sunnah as: "a set of actions or practical rules (excluding beliefs) which Prophet initiated promoted and performed among all of his followers as a part of God's religion (dīn) and that have been perpetuated from one generation to another practically". 53 Ansari echoes these words by stating that at the time of the famous Syrian scholar Awzaʾi (d. 157 AH) "the ways of referring to Sunnah, [however] were not standardised". 54 Similarly Wheeler in his investigation of second-century jurists such as Ibrahim (d. 182 AH) and Anas (d. 179 AH) maintains that the "concept and content of Sunnah was malleable because it was not yet to be limited to a textual corpus". 55 It is worth noting the words by Al-Azami in the same section of the book dealing with the early concept of Sunnah, which serves here as a means of a brief summary of what was said above with regards to semanticocontextual changes in the Sunnah: "Not only was the word Sunnah originally not confined to the practices of the Prophet: its meaning also underwent changes".
56
From the above discussion it can be established that the concept Sunnah underwent a series of semanico-contextual changes during the formative period of Islamic thought. The question that arises is why did the concept Sunnah undergo such semantico-contextual changes and which processes led to the classical definition of Sunnah? In other words, what were the background forces and mechanisms behind these semantico-contextual changes?
52 Guraya, supra note 25, "Introduction". 53 
Epistemologico-methodological Changes in Definition and Scope of the Sunnah
The questions raised above led us inevitably to the epistemologicomethodological aspects behind the transfer in meaning and connotation of the concept of Sunnah. This part of the article traces the development of the concept of Sunnah and how it was understood during the first four generations of Muslims.
In the context of the overall aims of this article than we are interested in, defining the scope of the body of knowledge used to determine what constituted Sunnah during the pre-classical period and juxtaposing it with the epistemological boundaries governing "authentic" Ḥ adīth to determine whether there are any epistemological discrepancies or disparities between the two. We are also interested in bringing to light the methodological tools used in defining and determining the concept of Sunnah during the pre-classical era and contrast these tools with those implied by the classical definition of Sunnah. Additionally, this will give us an insight into the epistemological boundaries and methodological mechanisms which have been used when defining Sunnah.
Part of the analysis will focus on depicting the broad and general trends in the evolution in perceptions of legitimacy of the use of raʾy (personal judgment based on reason) when defining the concept of Sunnah 57 and of the moral epistemological boundaries of the same. 58 This will allow us to establish if there was a qualitative difference in epistemological assumptions governing the concept of Sunnah during the pre-classical and classical periods as the classical definition of Sunnah excludes the use of reason when determining the Sunnah compliance or otherwise of a certain act or practices if it is based upon an authentic Ḥ adīth. In other words we shall try to ascertain to what extent and for how long Sunnah as a concept remained largely epistemologically and methodologically independent of 'authentic Ḥ adīth'. Chronology, as we shall see, plays a very important part in the way the relationship between Sunnah and "authentic Ḥ adīth" is 57 Since Sunnah is organically linked and derives its legitimacy from the Qurʾān, this analysis also applies to the Qurʾān. 58 The same could be applied to Qurʾānic interpretation but is outside the scope of this study. For a very insightful treatment of this question, see G. 61 claim that the emerging Qurʾānic Weltanschauung during the revelationary period was not completely divorced from its pre-Qurʾānic one. Although the Qurʾān is to be considered an independent ethico-religious and linguistic entity with its own worldview, it did not claim a complete epistemological break with pre-Qurʾānic Arabia. 62 Over the revelationary period of some two decades, the Qurʾān rejected, modified, condoned and accepted the socio-cultural values and moral of Arabian tribal communionism of pre-Qurʾānic Arabia in accordance with the budding Qurʾānic ontological and ethico-religious value system. The foundation of this emerging Qurʾānic view of "reality" was, quite naturally, the Qurʾān as embodied by the Prophet himself.
63
The notion of Sunnah was, as we argued earlier, a well-known concept in pre-revelational Arabia understood as a normative action-behavioural 64 system set by an individual worthy of tribe's emulation, in the post-revelational period logically ascribed to the bearer of Revelation himself. 65 With the Prophet amongst their midst, the early Muslim community had a direct 59 The author has presented an evolution of the concept of an authentic Ḥ adīth in the article, A. Duderija, "The evolution in the concept of an authentic Ḥ adīth in relation to the concept of Sunnah during the first four generation of Muslims", unpublished article. 60 access to the living commentary of the Revelation, and through him a living link to the Divine. The Prophet's persona and character as a source of Revelation-based authority and normativeness for his contemporary adherents and believers in his Prophethood was a natural fact and a matter of common sense. With the Prophet alive in Makkah/Medina, the Muslim community was witnessing his activities daily and was subject to his instructions directly, that is without an intermediary. The community did not engage in systematically debating the questions of the nature and the scope of the Prophetic authority. When the need arose they could seek advice and consult him in matters needing personal or communal clarification.
66
Indeed, in the Qurʾānic verses such as 59:7 67 and 4:64, 68 the Qurʾān mentions the necessary intervention of and obedience to the Prophet in the affairs of the community. 69 These, however, were not dogmatic in nature, i.e., did not pertain to the realm of beliefs.
70
The Qurʾān, therefore, can be said to testify to that fact that the Prophet enjoyed extra-revelational authority based on "right and just practice", 71 but that this privilege was always exercised in conjunction with concepts of mutual consultation with community in a most balanced and delicate way. 72 Additionally, Dutton further substantiates this point. Based on his study of Mālik's Muwaṭ ṭ a he asserts that, "for Mālik the Prophet is clearly a source of extra-Qurʾānic judgement but this 'extra-Qurʾānic' element is 66 Cf., Ansari, supra note 6, pp. 156-171. 67 Q59:7, "So take what Apostle assigns to you and deny yourselves that which he withholds from you" (Y. Ali). "And whatever the messenger gives you take it, but whatever he forbiddeth, abstain (from it)" (M. Picthall).
68 Q4:64: "We have sent not an Apostle but to be obeyed in accordance with the Will of Allah" (Y. Ali); "We sent the Messenger save that he should be obeyed by Allah's leave" (M. Picthall). 69 It must be admitted that the verses mentioned, like many parts of the Qurʾān, were situational/contextual in character and had specific occasions of revelation-first linked to the distribution of booty and second to a concrete internal problem within the Muslim Medinian community. 70 In these matters the Prophet's role was merely that of the Messenger, i.e., the conveyer of Revelation. 71 Additionally, the fact that ʿamal/practice of the entire Medinian community was recognised as a source of law by certain schools of thoughts (the Mālikī madhhab in particular) is clear evidence that the Prophet's authority was not restricted to theological or faith matters stemming from the Qurʾān. 72 Ibid., p. 186. Generally on this see Graham, supra note 3; also see, Ansari, supra note 6. Elaborating on this point of organic, directly interwoven SunnahQurʾān dynamic at the time of the Prophet in Mālik's Muwaṭ ṭ a, Dutton also remarks that:
Many of the fundamental obligations of the Qurʾān, such as doing the prayer, paying zakāt and going on hajj, could not have been put into practice unless there were some practical demonstrations of how to do so, and the obvious model for this of course was that of the one who first put thee obligations in practice, i.e. the Prophet. The Qurʾān could not, therefore, be divorced from its initial context, i.e. the life of the Prophet, and, although its supremacy of the text remained beyond question, it was always seen in the light of its first practical expression, namely, the Sunnah of the Prophet. 74 Thus, due to the nature of Qurʾānic content it was in need of Sunnah, that is, in need of both Deutungsbeduerftigkeit and of a practical manifestation in actu. This organic link between the Message and the Messenger is captured best by often-repeated Qurʾānic phrase exhorting the believers to "Obey God and the Prophet". 75 This unity of "prophetic-revelatory event", to use Graham's phrase, has from the very beginning and throughout the first 150 years of the formative Islamic thought reflected the early Muslim understanding of the function, nature the scope and the relationship between the Qurʾān and Sunnah. 76 This interdependent, symbiotic relationship between the Qurʾān and Sunnah enjoyed wide-spread acceptable in early Islam. In this context Graham maintains that:
It appears [that] for the Companions and the early Followers of the Prophet, the divine activity manifested in the mission of Muhammad was a unitary reality in which the divine word, the prophetic guidance, and even the example and witness of all who participated in the sacred history of the Prophet's time, were all perceived as complementary, integral aspects of a single phenomenon. 83 In this context, Ansari's following remarks are quite pertinent: Qurʾānic legislation differs from legal codes in form as well as in spirit and purpose. Its basic motivation is religious and moral rather than 'legal' in a narrow sense of the term. Its aim is to lay down certain standards of conduct that are intrinsically good and conducive to the good pleasure of God. Ansari, supra note 6, p. 143.
84 Or more precisely legal norms were conceived more in ethico-religious terms.
Prophet, was geared towards certain underlying legislative norms which were based on certain purposes and objectives. 85 Schacht (rightly) observes this fact when describing the origins and development of Islamic Law by saying: "Had religious and ethical standards been comprehensively applied to all aspects of human behaviour, and had they been consistently followed in practice, there would have been no room and no need for a legal system in the narrow meaning of the term. This was in fact the original ideal of Muhammad."
86 This claim will be investigated more closely in subsequent parts of this study.
As alluded to above, another phenomenon that needs to be taken into consideration in the context of evolution of the concept of Sunnah is that during the formative period of Islamic thought the oral nature of transmission and authentification of knowledge as well as oral-based interpretative strategies of the primary sources were considered more authentic and were more prevalent then written-based ones. In this context Souaiaia avers that:
In the practices of scholars and jurists closest to the time of the Prophet , there seems to be an overwhelming attraction to isnād-based oral reports and momentous lack of interest in the published literature, a phenomenon that can be documented for at least one-hundred years after the recording (tadwīn) era. 87 He also convincingly argues that the processes of formulation, preservation and transmission of religious and legal knowledge was "fully and exclusively oral". 88 The above distinctions are of fundamental importance to this study from the point of view of understanding the evolution of the concept of an authentic Sunnah in relation to that of an 'authentic' Ḥ adīth.
An additional issue needing clarification is the evolution in the scope of and the function or the employment of the use of reason in the Qurʾān and Sunnah, especially in relation to the assumptions governing the nature of 85 Ansari, supra note 6, pp. 144-146. This seemed to have given birth to jurisprudent and legal theory literature that emphasized the importance of the maqasid or purpose/ objective-based approach to Islamic Law and its theory as evident in the writings of AlTusi, Shatibi and Ghazali to name a few. See Hallaq, supra note 4. 86 In terms of epistemologico-methodological boundaries of the Sunnah at the time of the Prophet, Hourani states that in terms of ethical knowledge, the Qurʾān (and therefore Sunnah) considers revelation its major source but that "it is probable, but unproven, that natural reason is also capable of forming ethical judgements [independent of revelation]". 92 Furthermore, argues Hourani, in terms of ethical epistemology boundaries the Qurʾānic nature of ethical value is generally objective, "the use of independent reason in ethical judgements is never ruled out explicitly in the Qurʾān, and there are some considerations that favour implicit assumptions of its use". It is further maintained that:
. . . Qurʾān and Muhammad both display a common sense attitude and that we should not expect either of them to claim that for every ethical judgement he makes a man 89 Hourani, "Ethical Pre-Suppositions" is the most notable study on this question; see supra note 58. K. Reinhart's study on boundaries of moral epistemology in Islamic thought focuses on assessments of human acts prior to Revelation and how they were used in development of Islamic jurisprudential terminology and law as espoused by authorities living in the second and subsequent centuries who themselves operated within a larger Qurʾāno-Sunnahic hermeneutic; see Reinhart, Before Revelation-The Boundaries of Muslim Moral Thought, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995) 3. Some of the implicit findings of this study are useful to us and will be used in this article. Izutsu's works cited previously attempt to define Qurʾānic ethico-religious concepts from the point of view of historical semantics rather than their epistemological sources and as such are not directly our concern. 90 Reinhart, supra note 89, p. 178. 91 Ibid. 92 Hourani, supra note 58, p. 25. must consult a book or a scholar, or work out an analogy when the book or scholar give no direct answer to the Problem. 93 Draz, in his exhaustive investigation of the moral world of the Qurʾān, echoes this view by concluding that, according to the Qurʾānic moral world, the human consciousness in prior to Revelation and that is capable of divorcing right from wrong without it. 94 The essential common-sensical attitude of the Qurʾān and its message are evident in its discourse of "nature, ʿaql, the cosmos, and their patterns-all [are] appealed to say that the message of the Qurʾān is reasonable". 95 Thus, rationality and ethical objectivity certainly cannot be considered as alien to the overall spirit of Qurʾānico-Sunnahic teachings.
At the time of the Prophet then the concept of Sunnah was associated quite naturally with him, and, except from its ʿibadat component, seemed to have been understood primarily as a general, ethico-religious and, in Medina, politico-administrative, 96 concept based upon righteous customary practice that partially reflected some of the pre-Qurʾānic customs and practices not contrary to Qurʾānic worldview. 97 The legislative component of Sunnah, which in no doubt existed, was in consonance with the nature of the Qurʾān as the "most trustworthy mirror of the Prophet's outlook and teaching", also primarily conceived in religio-moral rather than positivistic terms. 98 These religious and moral teachings, in fact, functioned as a reference point for legal evaluation. 99 How the concept of Sunnah was understood in the subsequent two generation of Muslims is what we turn our attention to now. and the character of the Prophet based on the overall Qurʾānic worldview. Juynboll refers to this notion of Sunnah as "practice based on the memory of the collective concept of Prophet's followers on whose basis the community's cohesion rested".
101
During this period of time Prophet's Companions 102 observed his embodiment of the Qurʾānic message and how it was applied in society in terms of his behaviour, word and deed. The Prophet's action-behavioural system was quite naturally described by the Muslim community as Sunnah 103 and carried a degree of normativeness whose anchoring point was the Qurʾān. In cases of the performance of congregational prayers and ritual purification, for example, the Muslim community in Medina internalised and embodied these practices by engaging in their daily performance with the Prophet. Therefore both Companions and the Medinian community became the collective embodiment and perpetuators of these aspects of the Prophet's Sunnah. 104 In this context Graham astutely observes:
Naturally enough, the living Sunnah ("way", "practice") of the charismatic Ummah (and the Medinian community in particular), which was rooted in the Sunnah of the prophet, became the active, practical standard of authoritative faith and practice. Qurʾān were inseparable both of which were interpreted and perpetuated against the ʿamal/practice of the community rather than simply from the texts.
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The first link in this ʿamal and oral-based Sunnah were the caliphs who acted and expanded upon the Prophet's Sunnah after his death. As the political authority was transferred to them after the Prophet's demise, the caliphs, based on their impeccable status as witness bearers of the Qurʾāno-Sunnahic ideals, became sources of Sunnah themselves.
107 As Hallaq remarks "these caliphs set a model of good behaviour [and did not] necessarily laid down specific rulings". 108 Indeed, "caliphal authority was not derivative of that of the Prophet but ran parallel to it". 109 Juynboll maintains that "it is generally accepted fact that the first four caliphs set their own standards [and that] they ruled the community in the spirit of the Prophet, thinking their own solutions to the problems rather than meticulously copying his actions".
110 This is further substantiated by Souaiaia's assertion that the classical Islamic law recognised the personal informed opinion of the first four caliphs alongside those of renowned companions, in addition to the Qurʾān and Sunnah, to be sources of law.
111 Mathnee goes even further by stating that the early concept of Sunnah was such that it was used in an arbitrary 112 fashion without reference to a particular authority and that it was susceptible to continuous change. He maintains further that the Sunnah could refer to a practice or a tradition or a 106 Dutton, supra note 51, Chs. 8 and 9; Indeed this 'amal-based Sunnah was considered superior to Ḥ adīth; cf., Al-Qayrawani, supra note 104, p. 26; cf., Guraya, supra note 25; Abd-Allah, supra note 49. 107 . . . the associations of sunnas with persons other than the Prophet are so numerous and varied that that does not permit us to assume that the Prophet's example overshadowed or indeed eclipsed that of others, at least not during the first hundred and fifty years or so after his death.
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These different anchoring points and sources of Sunnah at this point in time, however, were considered as one coherent whole rather then being conceptually different in any significant way.
This 116 Juynboll, supra note 46, pp. 100-101. 117 Mathnee describes this Sunnah as having "an incoherent structure and arbitrary nature"; see supra note 17, Ch. 2. 118 Professor Rahman claims that in the early Muslim community, "Prophetic Sunnah was a general umbrella-concept rather than filled with an absolutely specific content flows directly, at a theoretical level, from the fact that Sunnah is a behavioural term: since no two cases, in practice, are ever exactly identical in their situational setting-moral, psychological and material-Sunnah must of necessity, allow for interpretation and adaptation." He also uses phrases for Sunnah such as "a point in direction rather than exactly laid out series of rules" or "Sunnah as authoritative, normative precedent" to further consolidate the point of generality and unspecifisity of Sunnah as a concept. See F. Rahman, "The Living Sunna and al-Sunnah wa l-Jamaʿah", pp. Sunnah, as a concept, therefore, was not seen as a codified set of positive laws but rather as either a moral precedent that could be adapted to various contexts/circumstances or was identified with certain practices evident in the Muslim Medinian community. Hallaq also takes the view that, at this time, Sunān "were not legally binding narratives but subjective notions of justice put to various uses and discursive strategies".
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The early Muslim community during the first two to three decades after the Prophet's death was still a relatively small, self-contained one where the vast majority of the Companions lived. 122 This meant that the prevalent conditions for diffusion of Sunān 123 without reliance on written documentation was relatively easy and quick to achieve, and remained the primary source of transmission of Sunān during the time of the Companions. 123 Sunān is plural rather than singular Sunnah due to above-mentioned reasons. 124 It also should be kept in mind that throughout this period, ʿamal-based Sunnah as well as values and ethico-religious-based Sunnah (derived from the Qurʾān) that was first half of the first century Hijrah and the accompanying changes in the socio-political climate made the problem of transmission and dissemination of non-written Sunān more difficult. 125 Companions, the sources and perpetuators of the Prophet's Sunnah as understood at that time-period, dispersed to various provinces of the everexpanding Muslim Empire. 126 With the establishment of the Companions in these provinces, people who did not have the opportunity to see the Prophet first-hand or were born after the Prophet's death, termed Successors (tabʿīn), were eager to find out from them what the Prophet did, how he behaved and acted. Companions, however, were facing increasingly new problems to which they had no specific Prophetic precedent due to the nature of the Sunnah as it was understood at that time. In such cases, Companions used their own judgment and reason in order to arrive at solutions, which were still considered as falling under the general aegis of the Prophetic precedent. Al-Azami also noted this by remarking that "[S]ometimes the norms drawn analogically from the practice or the sayings of the Prophet were also called sunna". 127 This assertion is also substantiated by the fact that Muslims at that time "regarded as authoritative not only the precepts and practices of the Prophet, but also those of his Companions". 128 In this context Hakim maintains that:
It is not unusual for companions of the Prophet to be credited with a Sunnah of their own. Thus, Abu Bakr, together with Umar, is credited to have Sunna . . . In other traditions we find expressions such like 'sunnāt Abī Bakr al-rashidah al-mahdiyah" or "sunnāt Abī Bakr aw ʿUmar aw Uthman aw ʿAlī ". Moreover, the Islamic tradition frequently refers to sunnāt ʿUmar.
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prevalent at the time of the Prophet and the Companions was epistemologically independent of any potentially written-based documentation of it. 125 We will investigate these more closely in the part that deals with evolution of writtenbased Sunnah. 126 That the Companions themselves made a distinction between Sunnah (in this instance in the form of the Medinian ʿamal ) and Ḥ adīth 'It has been transmitted that ʿUmar ibn al-Khattab said on the minbar, "Through Allah's help, glory be to Him, I will cause to be severely straightened the circumstance of any man who transmits a Ḥ adīth contrary to the ʿamal of Madinah".'
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The above-described concept of Sunnah seems to have been transmitted to the Successors largely in a manner similar to that which the Companions themselves received it that is via practical means based on the overall spirit of the Prophet's life legacy. For example, in Medina, a Successor, Ibn Musayyib (d. 90 H) and his colleagues founded schools of jurisprudence based on the verdicts of ʿUmar and Uthman, 131 while, in Kufa, Nakhaʾi (d. 95 H), also a Successor, and his associates, based their opinions and knowledge of jurisprudence (tafaqquh) on legal opinions ( fatwā, pl. futāwā) of an esteemed Companion Ibn Mas'ud (d. 94 H) and the fourth Caliph Alī (d. 40 H) largely independent of any written-based documentation of Prophetic actions or words. 132 The nature of this Sunnah as espoused by these authorities was still very much in tune with that of the Prophet, as Nakhai, an Iraqi law specialist:
. . . did no more than give opinions on questions of ritual and perhaps kindred problems of directly religious importance, cases of conscience concerning alms tax, marriage, divorce and the like, but not on technical points of law. The same is true of Ibrahim's contemporaries in Medina. 133 The legal character of Sunnah manifesting itself in a body of literature on positive law was thus still not evident at this point in time. This led Schacht to conclude that what we could term a distinctively new Qurʾāno-Sunnahic law anchored in the Prophetic dicta (Ḥ adīth, corpus-based or not) was non-existent during the most of the first century Hijrah. 134 This assertion is echoed by Hallaq who maintains that "evidence from the early sources appears to support the view that the legal authority during the better part of the first Islamic century was in no way exclusively Prophetic". 135 The jurisprudential activity of Successors led to the formation of regional centres of Sunnah based on their understanding of Sunnah that was transmitted to them via the Companions. Thus, the regional Sunnah was ultimately deriving its legitimacy and authority from the Companions rather than from the Prophet.
136 This geographically based Sunnah was then diffused throughout the region itself. It, in turn, served as a foundation on which the practice of the people was based or was normatively assessed against.
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As such, the Sunnah-based practices of Muslim community as a whole within a particular region also became embodiments of Sunnah as well as sources and perpetuators of Sunnah for subsequent generations.
The use of the practice of Muslims/believers in Medina as additional sources of Sunnah, argues Dutton, features prominently in Mālik's Muwaṭ ṭ a and is described as ʿamal. 138 This ʿamal was based upon the Qurʾān, Sunnah dating from time of the Prophet and an element of raʾy 139 of later authorities which merged into it. 140 Although what we just said pertains primarily to Medina, similar processes in other major regional schools such as Kufa, Basra, Syria and Egypt were taking place.
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For example, notion of practice as indicator of Sunnah is also evident in Abū Yusuf 's writings who lived in Kufa. The practice-based Sunnah derives, 135 taking with them the knowledge of Qurʾān and Sunnah, and exercising their best judgement ( yajtahidūna bi ra'yihīm) when they knew of no specific guidance on the matter . . . Furthermore the first three caliphs had been concerned to avoid dispute among the Muslim troops and had sent directives to them on even relatively unimportant matters in order to establish the dīn and prevent dispute over the Book and Sunnah, but they never told anyone to go against the practice of any of the companions, whether in Egypt, Syria or Iraq . . .", Dutton, supra note 51, p. 175; for regional differences in 'Sunnah' see also Al-Azami, supra note 50, pp. 58-80; Guraya, supra note 25, pp. 54-78, on what he refers to as "Ancient view of Sunnah and Ḥ adīth". in his view, from "those norms which were recognised as such by the Muslims in general, were accepted by the fuqahāʾ and which had come down through reliable and learned people (al-sunnah 'an rasul Allāh ʿan al-salaf min ashabih wa min qawm fuqahāʾ ). 142 145 Similarly, in Syria the notion of Sunnah as conceptualised by their region's main jurist, Awzaʾi, was understood in terms of an uninterrupted practice of Muslims beginning with the Prophet and maintained by the early caliphs and later scholars . . . without adducing of Ḥ adīth. 146 Therefore, "each locale, from Syria to Iraq to the Hejaz, established its own legal practices on the basis of what was regarded as the Sunnah of the forefathers, be they Companions or the Prophet". 147 Summarizing the nature and the scope and Sunnah's method of transmission at this point in time, Wheeler asserts:
The authority of the sunnah as prophetic practice, as conceived by the local second century authorities, was guaranteed by a continuous tradition of practice through generations going back to the prophet. It was defined as an interpretation having an authority that was conveyed by the link it represented with the prophetic past. Being regarded as either common practice or logically consistent practice, the content of sunnah was considered prophetic on account of its receipt from these previous generations or derivation on the basis of these generations' practice.
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In terms of its epistemological value, this practice-based Sunnah was, like the Qurʾān and unlike a majority of Ḥ adīth, a mutawātir-based source of knowledge.
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Since Sunnah, in its narrowest edified sense, could only literally be applied to those practices and behaviours that surfaced and were established during the Prophet's lifetime, the scope of that body of Sunnah was rather limited and was increasingly in need of interpretation and extrapolation. This interpretative need of Sunnah, based on the same characteristic of the Qurʾānic text itself, could be satisfied by identifying it 150 with certain more abstract principles said to be in accordance with the spirit of the Qurʾān and Sunnah, 151 and which could be deemed relevant to a new case. As well, its scope could be expanded by legitimising the use of personal judgement based on reason (raʾy).
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The former is termed 'applied reason or analogy' (qiyās) and the later 'pure reason' (raʾy/ijtihād ). Decisions based on these thought processes 148 Wheeler, supra note 55, p. 43. On the meaning of mutawātir see below. 149 Dutton, supra note 51, p. 36. At this stage, the ethico-religious and values-based aspects of Sunnah embedded in the Prophet's rational embodiment of the Qurʾānic Weltanschauung started to receive less attention in the overall understanding of the concept of Sunnah by Muslim scholars as Sunnah came to be increasingly identified with ʿamal or practices extant in the communities. This distorted the nature and the scope of the concept as it was understood by the Prophet and the first generation of would also become parts of Sunnah. Indeed, in this context, Guraya in his close analysis of the concept of Sunnah in early Islam maintains that speculative free thought was considered as genuine, valid and authoritative constituent of Sunnah. 153 This is exactly what happened when the first four caliphs introduced certain penalties, for example, in cases of alcohol prohibition and punishment that had neither a direct precedent in the Qurʾān or in the Sunnah. 154 These practices were, however, later considered as Sunnah for two reasons. Firstly, they were consistent with the concept of the spirit of Sunnah because of Sunnah's conceptualisation in abstract valueoriented terms. Secondly, and as a direct result of this understanding of Sunnah, the caliphs themselves as well as other Companions and fuqahāʾ, were considered sources as well as perpetuators of Sunnah. 155 In this context Abbott asserts that her investigation of early Arabic literary papyri has led her to conclude that:
[The ] term sunnah [which] frequently alternates with the plural Sunān, is not limited to the example or conduct of Muhammad but applies also to at least the caliphs Abu Bakr and ʿUmar I and to a number of outstanding men who held high office under their three heads of state.
Indeed, the basis of Caliphal Law throughout the Umayyad period (up to 132 AH/750 CE) was based on the Qurʾān, Sunnah in a sense of general, good practice and raʾy, so that the Umayyad caliphs were "free to make and unmake Sunnah as they wished". 156 Additionally, and importantly, "the concept of Sunnah was not in itself an obstacle to legal innovation".
157
Raʾy as well as qiyās were essentially seen as legitimate, pragmatical tools in extrapolating law and had a positive connotation to them. 158 Ansari considers that the personal judgements of jurists "which were considerably influenced by subjective considerations . . . [and] accompanied by a broad understanding of the spirit and goals of Islam, played a fairly important 153 Guraya, supra note 25, "Introduction". 154 Ibid., p. 8. 155 In other words, if a behaviour, norm or practice was considered to be just or righteous and was not directly linked to a Qurʾānic or Sunnahic precedent and justice/righteousness was equated with the spirit of Sunnah (and the Qurʾān) then that behaviour, norm or practice was considered to be a Sunnah. 156 161 Hallaq, furthermore, asserts that the meaning of raʾy during the entire first century Hijrah and the portion of the next "was a major sources of legal reasoning and judicial rulings" 162 and furthermore was "very close to and, in fact, could not be separated from Sunnah."
163 Similarly, Guraya in his examination of Mālik's concept of Sunnah identifies sound reason and independent considered opinion (raʾy) as being contituative of Sunna.
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This raʾy, in words of Rahman, produced an immense wealth of legal, religious and moral ideas during the first one and a half centuries approximately . . . [and] the product of this activity became rather chaotic, i.e. the Sunnah of different regions-Hejaz, Iraq, Egypt-became divergent on almost every issue of detail". 165 Not only were there differences in doctrines between various regions but also within them. 166 Juynboll summarises the methods of Sunnahic development during the first century Hijrah by saying that two distinct manners were evident: that is by resorting to individual judgement (common sense or raʾy) and by the quest for, and transmission of, a precedent. 167 In a similar tone Hallaq asserts that "as late as 90s AH and some decades after qadis (jurists) relied on three sources of authority in framing their rulings: Qurʾān, Sunān 168 (including caliphal law) and discretionary opinion (raʾy)". 169 Again, it is 159 Ansari, supra note 54, p. 153. 160 Motzki, supra note 145, p. 256. 161 Schacht, supra note 86, p. 35. 162 Hallaq, supra note 61, pp. 52-53. 163 Ibid. 164 Guraya, Origins, pp. 115, 119. 165 Rahman, supra note 118, p. 139; cf., Wheeler, supra note 55, pp. 19-43. 166 Motzki, in the context of the beginnings of the development of Islamic jurisprudence in Makkah says: "Die Rechtsgelehrsamkeit in Mekka war trotz eines Konsenses in vielen Fragen nicht uniform", supra note 145, p. 258. 167 Juynboll, supra note 46, p. 33; cf., Ansari, supra note 142, pp. 495-496. 168 As understood in accordance with what was said above. 169 Hallaq, supra note 61, p. 44.
important to note that these sources of Sunnah were entirely independent of any form of written documentation (i.e. Ḥ adīth).
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Our discussion on the evolution of the concept of Sunnah leads us now to the next generation of Muslims, that of the Successors' Successors.
Sunnah at the Time of the Successors' Successors
With the end of the first and beginning of the second century, significant changes to the concept of Sunnah in the minds of the third generation of Muslims started to develop in terms of its source, mode of transmission, methodological and epistemological parameters (that is, its nature, sources and scope). In this context Juynboll asserts that:
. . . the approximate date of origin of the narrowing down of the concept of Sunnah, formerly comprising the Sunnah, or exemplary behaviour, of the Prophet as well as his most devoted followers, to the exemplary behaviour of Prophet only . . . [occurred] towards the end of the first century of the Hijrah and was conceived at the time of Caliph Umar ibn Abd al-Aziz (99-101). 171 Hallaq dates this shift somewhat earlier by saying that the isolation of Prophetic Sunnah 172 from other Sunān began to emerge by the late 60s AH. The reasons for this process began in the second half of the first century. The continued territorial expansion of Muslims meant that ever more complex legal and governing processes and institutions had to be put in place within the enlarging boundaries of the area under the Muslim rule. The notion of the administrative and social practices being based on the Qurʾān and Sunnah were still operative and engrained in the minds of those Muslims who conquered new lands.
A general perception that the expanding Muslim empire would become organically detached from the Qurʾānic and Sunnahic teachings was becoming widespread. This realisation had already prompted some Muslims to collect and gather a bound (mushaf ), official version of the Qurʾān, a task that was largely achieved during the reign of the third Caliph 170 Dutton, supra note 51, p. 168. 171 Juynboll, supra note 101, p. 30. This period marks only the beginning of the concept of Sunnah of the Prophet as having its own content. Sunnah was a notional and abstract concept throughout the Caliph Umar's reign; see Crone and Hinds, supra note 32, pp. 73-80. 172 The nature of this Prophetic Sunnah, according to Hallaq, was practice-based, oral, fluid and mixed with non-Prophetic material; see supra note 61, p. 50.
Uthman (d. 35 AH).
173 Additionally, a change in political fortunes and the subsequent rise of the Abbasid dynasty (132 AH), that used the concept of custodians of the Prophet's Sunnah through his uncle's cousin Abbas to justify and legitimise their political power, created an ever greater impetus for a more systematic collection of, and searching for, Sunnah in any form. 174 This, in turn, gave rise to a ṭ alab al-ʿilm phenomenon 175 which gradually started to transform behaviour-practice-based regional Sunnah into writtenbased 'Sunnah'. Another factor that started to give shape to the later concepts of an 'authentic Ḥ adīth' was the partisan tensions that emerged within the nascent Muslim community. These brought serious schisms based on conflicting claims to the successorship of the Prophet's political authority as well as certain theological controversies prevalent at the time.
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These two divergent, powerful trends resulted firstly in practice-based Sunnah being increasingly clad in the mantle of written-based predominantly purely Prophetic Sunnah, and secondly in the development of more stringent mechanisms in establishing the authenticity of written-based Sunnah, especially in terms of the mode of its transmission, i.e. ʿulūm al-isnād. The custom of reliance on regionally practice-based Sunnah was increasingly becoming challenged by a growing corpus of written-based 173 The traditional classical as well as Western accounts of the arrangement and collection of the Qurʾān have been challenged by the Islahi school of thought in Pakistan who are of the view, based on careful Qurʾānic analyses and that of traditional historiographies such as Tabaqat of Ibn Sa'ad and Tarikh of Al-Tabari, that the Qurʾān has been arranged and collected by the Prophet before he died. See www.understanding-islam.org and www.studying-islam.org. 174 Abbott has identified a number of other specific factors which favoured the recording of Ḥ adīth including the socio-economic ambitions of the non-Arabs attained by their involvement in religious sciences, the threat and fear of heresy and religious innovation (bidaʾah) creeping into the tradition, the firm establishment of family isnād, the expansion of journeys (rihlah, talab) aimed for collection of reports and of the profession of the warraq (book seller/publisher, the increase in student population and the progressive lengthening of isnād. Nabia Abbott, Studies in Arabic Literary Papyri, Quranic Commentary and Tradition, Vol. 2, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press) 1967, p. 56. 175 Journeys undertaken by pious Muslims who wanted to preserve the Prophet's words and put them in writing. Also referred to as rihlah. On the extent of these journeys and how they contributed to the development of the early Islamic written tradition, see Abbott, ibid., pp. 40-57. 176 The same epistemologico-methodological changes can also be observed in the science of Qurʾānic commentary. For more on this, see J. van Ess, Ḥ adīth und Theologie, Berlin, 1975, p. 185. Sunnah as the by-product of ṭ alab al-ʿilm. 177 The objectives of this search for knowledge/ʿilm were such as to collect as much information about the Prophet as possible in all spheres of his life. No qualitative distinction between the Prophet's role as a Messenger, judge, ethico-moral reformer, family man or statesman was made, and no careful consideration was given to the fact that this could conceptually change the nature and the scope of the concept of the Qurʾān and Sunnah and their interrelationship that existed during the first three generations.
The "epistemological promise", to use Prof. El-Fadl's phrase, of having access to the actual words of the Prophet himself in a documented form was much more attractive and "logical" than the regional concept of Sunnah. One could argue that it was considered superior to it for several reasons by many of those who accepted its epistemologico-methodological premises. Firstly, the oral and then written in nature of proliferating 'Sunnah' was more tangible than one based on a vague behaviourally practical or abstract values-or objective-based concept. Secondly, written-based Sunnah was more voluminous as it was collected across all regions of the Muslim empire rather than being limited to just one area. Thirdly, it was more specific and dealt with a broader subject matter than a practice-based Sunnah, which was often based on the spirit of the Qurʾān and Sunnah and was more difficult to verify. Fourthly, most of the reports were claimed to be going back to the Prophet, while the immediate source of practicebased Sunnah were the Successors and the practice of the community at the time. Fifthly, the practice of the regional community as a source of Sunnah was sometimes problematic because not all community practices were Sunnah-based so that scepticism about all of the community practices started slowly to creep in. 178 Lastly, rather than relying on the general practice of the entire community, many of whom were ignorant of the complexities pertaining to the value and preservation of this newly formed concept of written-dependent Sunnah, one was presented with a chain/ isnād of several transmitters, many of whom were held in high esteem and were said to have had an unbroken 'link' to the Prophet himself and, as such, qualified as Sunnah's custodians.
Despite this paradigm shift in the way Sunnah was becoming to be viewed, the broader view of Sunnah still existed throughout the second century. When we examine the period of founders of the personal schools . . . it is not necessary that Sunnah be always deduced and known from a Ḥ adīth. Early texts on law show that the term Sunnah was used in a sense of the established practice of the Muslims claiming to have come down from the time of the Prophet. That is why Sunnah sometimes contradicts Ḥ adīth and sometimes Ḥ adīth documents it. 184 Therefore, existence of Ḥ adīth did not mean an a priori dispensing with the earlier concept of Sunnah. Moreover, as we shall subsequently argue, we can infer from Hasan's above-cited statement that the practice-based Sunnah was used as a criterion for distilling Sunnah congruent from Sunnah non-congruent Ḥ adīth. In the context of the definition of Sunnah during this time of personal schools of thought, 185 we need to remember that there now existed two significant and accepted modes of its transmission, namely practical and Ḥ adīth-based. These two modes of transmission of Sunnah were based on two different epistemologico-methodological foundations. The reasons for this were the existing and acknowledged fabrications and contradictory elements becoming evident during the process of formulation of writtenbased Sunnah, and the possible contamination of practice-based Sunnah with the general practice of community. Therefore "the concern of all ancient [i.e. personal] schools of thought was thus to know what represented the genuine, normative Sunnah of the Prophet and his Companions". 186 Both, according to this view, however, could embody Sunnah.
The Iraqis referred to the Sunnah which functioned as a "Sunnah filter" as al-sunnah al-maḥ fula al-maʿrufa, the well-established Sunnah, 187 and it was this Sunnah that was accepted as normative by the consensus of the majority of ʿulama referred to as ijmāʿ ".
188 Mālik ibn Anas referred to it as sunnah ʿindana or at times ʿamal and it acted as the final arbiter and ultimate proof of the Prophetic practice.
189 Some parts of this ʿamal was considered to be Sunnah whilst others were not. Guraya who investigated Mālik's usage of the concept of Sunnah in his Muwaṭ ṭ a has determined the actual constituents of Sunnah according to Mālik as follows: The regional Sunnah we described above was, according to Rahman, constantly re-defined and re-crystallised based as it was on two methodological tools: ijtihād-qiyās (personal opinion thought to be in accordance with the broad, general concept of regional Sunnah termed al-sunnah al-maʿrufa) and ijmā' whose ultimate anchoring point was the Prophet. 194 The prevalence of this fundamentally same attitude to Sunnah at this time period is demonstrated by the fact that the bulk of Al-Shaibanī's (d. 189) last work entitled Siyar al-Kābir consists of his own ijtihād. This was based on his scrutiny of works of earlier generations rather than any literal adherence to Ḥ adīth.
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As far as the use of raʾy based on ʿaql during the second century AH is concerned, a similar narrowing down of its legitimacy, scope and connotation was starting to take place, but this process, just like in the case of 190 Ibid. Perhaps the only notable difference is that these authorities had to deal with growing number of Ḥ adīth and were under a growing influence of them as potentially and contingently (upon regional Sunnah-based criteria) embodying Sunnah but not an a priori acceptance.
Sunnah, was incomplete. 196 Reinhart argues that throughout the Abbasid era, which includes the period under question, the Islamic worldview:
. . . was complemented by religious ideology arguing that all human kind share[ed] a kind of moral common sense, the ʿaql, which has always enabled humans to know the good from detestable. In this process of trying to account for this universal knowledge, scholars sought to locate acts, values in the act itself and the valuation of it in the ʿaql . . . Muslim Revelation, consequently, was understood as a supplementary form of knowledge, one that confirmed ʿaql . . . 197 As we previously mentioned, for example, numerous fuqahāʾ, who died during the second and the third decade of the second century, relied heavily on exercising personal opinions based on reason/ ʿaql rather than being involved in Ḥ adīth transmission. 198 This trend was evident also among many second or even third century authorities who belonged to the Ahl al-Sunnah (or were given the title of ṣ āhib sunnah) but who were not necessarily associated with proficiency and accuracy of Ḥ adīth transmission. 199 At the time of Ibn Al-Muqaffa (d. 140), the positive connotations of raʾy were still in operation although they had started to develop a negative connotation as well. 200 As the Ḥ adīth body of literature was gradually expanding, views not based on these now entirely textual sources of Sunnah increasingly started to denote 'arbitrary opinion' in the minds of those engaged in the process of written documentation of Sunnah. 201 This mixed trend of good and bad ra'y was still evident at the time of Abū Yusuf (d. 182) and Shaibanī (d. 189). However, since Sunnah was increasingly associated with literal adherence to proliferating Ḥ adīth, which were thematically diverse and quite comprehensive, in contrast to being interpreted against the background of ʿamal-based Sunnah or sunnah al-maʿrufah, conceptually Sunnah's nature was becoming more edified and its scope was ever more narrowingly defined.
The growing insistence on a literal following (bi-lā kaifa) of 'authentic Ḥ adīth', as the only legitimate sources and perpetuators of Sunnah, its superiority as a tool of Qurʾānic tafsīr (exegesis) at the cost of non-writtenbased Sunnah, and reason-based opinion (raʾy) began to considerably narrow down the epistemologico-methodological playfield of both the Qurʾān and Sunnah and therefore the nature and the scope of the concept of Shariʿah. This methodological concept of bi-lā kaifa (literally 'without asking how') was based on the premise that whatever is written in the Qurʾān as well as in 'authentic Ḥ adīth' is not allowed to be contextualised, interpreted in a metaphorical sense or based on certain non-textual epistemological and methodological tools such as notion of ethical objectivism, the use of reason or concept of the spirit and rationale (qasd ) of the Qurʾān and Sunnah which were, as we saw earlier, the foundation of Qurʾānic and Sunnahic teachings as characterised by the Prophet's embodiment of the Qurʾānic message put into practice and perpetuated by the first three generations of Muslims.
A significant impetus to this view of the epistemologico-methodological superiority of Ḥ adīth-based Sunnah to that of al-sunnah al-maʿrufah was provided by Shāfiʿī who belonged to the fourth generation of Muslims.
Sunnah at the Time of Shāfiʿī and Beyond
In the previous part of our discussion we alluded generally to the forces which were contributing towards the growth of the written recordings of (reportedly) Prophet's actions and words and the absorption of nonwritten-based Sunnah into them. We also saw that a broader and narrower version of Sunnah were co-existent with an increased tendency for 'Ḥ adīth-ification' of regional Sunnah. We shall refer to these factors as mechanisms of traditionalisation. Calder describes this process as a transition from a discursive tradition to a hermeneutic tradition (purporting to derive the law exegetically from the Prophetic sources). 202 Ansari, similarly, talks in terms of the shift towards "an objectively justifiable juristic theory" at the time of Shāfiʿī. 203 Therefore, those religious authorities that fully embraced and adhered to this narrower epistemologico-methodologal definition of Sunnah (Sunnah equals 'authentic Ḥ adīth') are conventionally referred to 202 Norman Calder, Studies in Early Muslim Jurisprudence (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 1993, p. 8. He also suggests, in the same sentence, that this process "was a lengthy and complex one". 203 as traditionalists (Ahl al-Ḥ adīth) while others who remained faithful to the broader definition of Sunnah, which included an element of raʾy, were given the title of rationalists (Ahl al-Raʾy).
204
The increasing epistemologico-methodological constraints on Sunnah emerged as a by-product of this traditionalisation towards the end and the beginning of the second century with the process of systematic collection and criticism of Ḥ adīth. 205 These efforts bore fruit in form of the collection of large quantities of purely written-based 'Sunnah' that were claimed to have originated from the very mouth of the Prophet. This 'Sunnah', although originally oral in nature was in due course completely writtenbased and came from every corner of the Muslim empire. 206 Its authenticity was guaranteed by an increasingly 'healthier' isnāds as developed by muḥ adīthiūn. 207 The champion of this definition of 'Sunnah' was the famous jurist Shāfi'ī (d. 204). Shāfiʿī's concept of Sunnah was : 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14   15  16  17  18  19  20  21   22  23  24  251   26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39 crystallising and re-interpreted by the fuqahāʾ in the light of ʿamal was becoming ever more legalistic and written in nature. The fuqahāʾ of the regional and personal schools of law (as we briefly outlined and shall deal with in more detail in the next part of the study on Ḥ adīth-dependent Sunnah) developed their own hermeneutic of Sunnahic definition and interpretation based on their broader hermeneutic orientation which, in the eyes of Ahl al-Ḥ adīth, suffered from numerous defects. 210 As such, Shāfiʿī often accused these fuqahāʾ, such as Abū Yusuf and Mālik, of ignoring or interpreting away the Ḥ adīth in favour of their own school's doctrine or that of their own raʾy.
211
A fāqih who belonged to a personal school of law was increasingly presented with a dilemma either of following the school's doctrine of Sunnahic hermeneutic or that of Shāfiʿī. 212 A dilemma was made much more difficult if the fāqih had to judge a case that did not have a direct precedent in his school's doctrine but was found in an isolated 213 Ḥ adīth going back to the Prophet pertaining to the matter at hand, or if these two legal tools were contradictory.
Rather than opting for acceptance of a 'raw' Ḥ adīth unknown to previous authorities belonging to same school, the majority of fuqahāʾ belonging to a particular school of thought, especially those of lower status, were faithful and obedient (muqallid ) to their school's hermeneutic. 214 In discussing this, Brown astutely observes that, with the exception of Ḥ anbalism, the theoretical triumph of the Shāfiʿī's concept of Sunnah affected the personal schools of law only "peripherally". The allegiance to the school's doctrine of legal theory, he further maintains, was based on 210 So beware of irregular (shadhdh) Ḥ adīth and go by those Ḥ adīth, which are accepted by the community and recognised by, the fuqahāʾ [as valid] and which are in accordance with the Qurʾān and Sunnah. Judge matters on that basis".
217
Thus this "sunnaic-concensual practice", to use Hallaq's terminology that was considered binding was seen as "determinative of Ḥ adīth".
218
As Brown writes, these personal schools of thought (madhahib) 219 "had given assent in theory to the importance of Ḥ adīth whilst resisting its thorough application" creating a tension between Shāfiʿī's definition of Sunnah and "the actual doctrine of the madhhab". 220 The consolidating Ahl al-Ḥ adīth movement, however, increasingly questioned these practices as being un-Sunnahic, throwing the doors wide-open for the concept of ihy al-sunnah, revivification of and return to Prophetic Sunnah, by means of a literal adherence to 'authentic Ḥ adīth' without any intermediaries.
Shāfiʿī's methodological innovation did not only pertain to Sunnah but also to the entire evolving legal theory. To him is attributed the title of the 215 This consensus should not be confused with the later definition of it in form of ijmāʿ but should be understood in terms of the agreed living practice constituting Sunnah. Cf. Hallaq 218 Hallaq, supra note 61, p. 110. 219 For the sake of simplicity, madhhab is rendered here as schools of thought/law. For its various definitions and evolution, see Melchert, "Introduction", supra note 179. 220 Brown, supra note 2, p. 20.
first scholar to develop a systematic model of law derivation, and in many ways he was considered a father of Islamic jurisprudence.
221
The efforts of Shāfiʿī to systematise and develop a more coherent model of legal theory by making Ḥ adīth the only vehicle of perpetuation and sole repository of Sunnah, supported by Ahl al-Ḥ adīth, resulted in the further consolidation 222 of existing personal schools of law such as the Mālikī, Ḥ anafī and later on development of Shāfiʿī and Ahl al-Ḥ adīth madhhabs.
Shāfiʿī's hierarchical legal theory set up for purposes of defining the epistemological boundaries and methodological procedures for derivation of positive law was, apart from the Qurʾān and Ḥ adīth-based Sunnah, founded on ijmaʾ and on qiyas. 223 The increasingly hierarchical structure of this entirely textual hermeneutic (the Qurʾān and Ḥ adīth) meant, however, that non-textual sources (practice-based Sunnah/well-known Sunnah, abstract ethico-moral principles, ijmāʿ and analogy) were largely displaced and constrained by them. In relation to this phenomenon Wheeler asserts:
By defining the revelation as a text that requires interpretation as epitomized by prophetic practice contained in the textual corpus of the Sunnah, the theories associated with Shāfiʿī shifted the guarantee of the local authorities' opinions away from the local definitions of traditional practice and toward a notion of authority based on the transmission and interpretation of texts.
224
Writing about this epistemologico-methodological shift, Rahman comments that while in earlier times of the Companions the use of ijtihād slowly crystallised in consensus, giving rise to al-sunnah al-maʿrufah (well-known Sunnah), only to be again abolished and re-formulated in the light of new circumstances, the epistemological value of ijtihād was reversed in the post-Shāfiʿī period so that ijtihād was significantly constrained by the ijmāʿ 222 I.e., Shāfiʿī's more systematic approach to law provided an impetus for the existent schools of law to develop their own hermeneutic that was more coherent, hierarchical and systematic in nature. 223 For a critique of this view, see J. Lowry, "Does Shāfiʿī have a Theory of Four Sources of Law", in: Studies in Islamic Legal Theory, B. Weiss, ed., pp. 23-50. For the critique of the critique, see ibid., pp. 389-391. 224 Wheeler, supra note 55, p. 18.
principle. 225 All this contributed to "the conviction becom[ing] absolute that law is justified only if it can be related hermeneutically to Prophetic example, and not if it is presented discursively as emanating from an ongoing juristic tradition. 226 This, of course, is directly related to the fact that the epistemologico-methodologically broader concept of Sunnah prevailed and was considered superior to Ḥ adīth during the formative period of Islamic thought.
The coalescing of concepts of Sunnah with "authentic Ḥ adīth" in theory was, to a large extent, clearly evident but not fully complete at time of Shāfiʿī. 227 The person who is to be accredited with this is one of the main proponents of Ahl al-Ḥ adīth Sunnahic hermeneutic, Ahmad ibn Ḥ anbal (d. 241 AH).
228 His approach to the concept of Sunnah is clearly demonstrated in his treatise Tabagatul-Ḥ anbalah 229 in which he states: "And the Sunnah with us are the āthār 230 (narrations) of the Prophet" (wa l-sunnatu 'indana atharu rasulillah). Moreover, in terms of epistemologicomethodological value and interpretational tool of Ḥ adīth, Ḥ anbal maintains that: "the Sunnah (i.e. athār/ḥ adīth) explains and clarifies the Qurʾān (wa l-sunnatu 231 tufassir al-qurʾān) . . . there is no analogical reasoning in the Sunnah and the examples are not to be made for it" (wa laisa fī l-sunnati qiyās, wa lā tudhrabu laha l-amthal ).
Nor is it [Sunnah] grasped and comprehended by the intellects or the desires (wa lā tudraka bi-l-ʿuquli wa lā l-ahwa' )". 232 Thus, Sunnah was epistemologically and methodologically self-identified with ḥ adīth/athār and was considered as supreme commentary upon the already earlier discussed deutungsbeduerfigkeit of the Qurʾān. 230 Athār is usually a synonym for Ḥ adīth, going back to the timer of the Prophet but also to the Companions; see Ansari, supra note 19, p. 256. 231 The word Sunnah is used here rather than Ḥ adīth but given the previous statement it is to be understood in the sense of athār/ḥ adīth. 232 As cited in Ibn Ḥ anbal, The Sunnah, pp. 11-12. 233 See the first page of this article.
Since the Ahl al-Ḥ adīth movement, unlike other schools of thought, considered both theological and jurisprudential sciences based on both Qurʾānic and Sunnahic interpretation completely dependable on literal, Ḥ adīth-based Sunnah devoid of imput of reason, Hourani maintains that the inherently Qurʾānic principles of ethical objectivism and partial rationalism were transformed into ethical volunterism (ethical concepts understood only in terms of God's will) 234 and traditionalism (humans can never know what is morally right by independent reason, but only by revelation and derived sources), 235 thereby changing the epistemologicomethodological character of both the Qurʾān and Sunnah. 236 In this context, Reinhart asserts that "[At] this point in time Islam itself became the standard and the congruence of reason and religion, which once served to justify religion, now, at best, justified reason". 237 Furthermore, the overriding principles of textual hermeneutic also meant "Revelation must categorically alter morality and epistemology . . ." and by inference "[B]efore or without Revelation there can be no moral knowledge". 
Conclusion
At the beginning of this article, two questions that guided its analyses were asked: namely whether the traditional definition of Sunnah that took root and established itself during the post-formative or classical period of Islamic thought reflect the way this term was understood during the preclassical period. The answer, based on our above analyses is a clear 'no'. We have seen that over a period of some 250 years Sunnah was semanticocontextually and epistemologico-methodologically fluid. Secondly, this article has attempted to explain which mechanisms were responsible for its conflation with an authentic Ḥ adīth as defined by the classical ʿulūm al-ḥ adīth sciences and when they became apparent. From the above chronological analyses of the concept of Sunnah we can conclude the 234 God's will, however, is always subject to the interpretation of those who engage in deducing meaning from the text; El-Fadl, Speaking, pp. 115-132. 235 There was a degree or variation on these issues between different as well as within schools of thought. For an exhaustive discussion on this issue, see Reinhart, supra note 89, pp. 11-37. 236 Hourani, supra note 58, pp. 2-3. 237 Reinhart, supra note 89, p. 178. 238 Ibid., p. 183.
following. At the time of the Prophet and the first three to four generations of Muslims, the Qurʾān and Sunnah, in terms of their nature and scope, were conceptually seen as one organic whole. In addition to the ʿibadah dimension of Sunnah both of these sources of Islamic thought were primarily seen in ethico-religious and objective or values-based concepts and were reason inclusive. All these aspects of Sunnah could be formulated, preserved and transmitted orally. The concept of Sunnah was conceptually differentiated from that of Ḥ adīth may it be in a form of sunnah al-maʿrufah or that of sunnah madiyyah. With the process of what we have described as traditionalisation, this concept of the nature and the scope of the concept of Sunnah (and that of the Qurʾān) underwent important conceptual changes. Severance of the symbiotic link between the Qurʾān and Sunnah occurred, and, over time, its hermeneutical dependence on Ḥ adīth-based literature was largely engendered, thus changing conceptually its nature and scope as it was understood during the first three generations of Muslims. 239 Secondly, the nature and the scope of the concept of Sunnah was conceptually distorted and conflated with the concept of 'a post-Shāfiʿī authentic Ḥ adīth' which is how the contemporary Islamic majority mainstream thought continues to conceptualise it to this day.
